A common complaint from those in favor the the status quo is: what harm could there possibly be in storing your URL? Allow me to give two examples to illustrate potential for harm.
Military/Gov't Contractor blogging environment
I don't know how many of you have worked for a military or US gov't contractor in the past, but one of their concerns when it comes to information disclosure is the revelation of employee names to third parties. Foreign intelligence officers (FIOs) from e.g. Syria, North Korea, China, Iran, etc. are always on the lookout for employee names/identifiable information so that they can potentially exploit that person as an intelligence asset, either via compromising their home (or work) machines with spear-phishing attacks or via direct physical surveillance. The vast majority of proprietary/classified information leaks come not through direct technological hacks/cracks but through social engineering and careful use of human factors (see Mitnick, et al.)
In the event that a contractor is using WordPress internal to the company and employing custom themes or plugins whose authors (as is a good practice in the WP community) have identified themselves, the .org site is potentially storing said information in a way directly tied to the company. If WordPress.org inadvertantly discloses the information in question, either through human error on their part or through a security breach by FIOs, you now have exploitable humint on discrete employees working for said contractors.
If it was widely known, this fact alone is enough to make most contractors' IT departments ban WordPress outright. At the very least, they will disable update checking in its entirety. Neither of these situations is particularly a good thing.
Political Dissident blogging environment
I referred to FIOs above. For hostile/totalitarian regimes, FIOs generally serve two purposes: exploitation of information from gov't interests and observation/intimidation of political dissidents.
As in the gov't contractor example I gave above, if dissidents are using any custom themes or plugins, their information could be accidentally disclosed to FIOs which could either lead to direct physical danger for themselves (if they are living within the borders of an oppressive state) or, in the case of ex-pats with families that remain behind, danger for their families still under the sway of these states.
Or, say a plugin was written that made your stylesheet go green in support of the protestors in Iran. If WP.org's data was compromised, Iranian IOs would have access to a comprehensive list of folks running said plugin (and a list of everyone using the Farsi locale) and thus be able to narrow their intelligence-gathering and intimidation efforts based solely upon an installed plugin.
If you think I'm being paranoid here, please see the recent examples of Egypt and Cuba jailing political bloggers and the Iranian intelligence services threatening expats (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1259...LEFTTopStories)
(I'm not even going to get into the area of compulsory legal disclosure of the info -- i.e., a third party brings suit or attempts to get law enforcement to retrieve .org's data based upon discovery or a warrant.)
I sincerely and truly don't understand the resistance to 1) full disclosure of retention policies and 2) anonymyzation of data via a one-way hash. Contra Otto, it's not "just" a URL in these situations, it's real people whose real lives stand to be substantively affected in the event of a disclosure, unintentional or otherwise.


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